This paper investigates whether barriers to currency competition placed on suppliers of money are associated with higher rates of inflation. First, I look at historical data on average annual inflation rates for nine OECD countries that experienced periods of free banking. Then I compare these countries' average inflation rates during free banking to their averages under central banking. Second, using a cross-section of OECD countries, I find that countries allowing citizens to legally hold foreign currency tend to have lower average rates of inflation. My results show that allowing competition among currency issuers heightens the incentives for monetary issuers to pursue lower inflation rates.
1.Introduction
In 1960, Nobel laureate M. Friedman published A Program for Monetary Stability in which he investigated the reasons why governments should regulate monetary and banking arrangements. Friedman stated that only government issuers of currency have the ability to limit the amount of money supplied as a means to maintain the value of their currency higher than the marginal printing costs. Friedman argued that if monetary arrangements were left to market forces and competition, there would be a possibility for hyperinflation caused by private issuer's incentives to print excess amounts of their currency.
In 1976, another Nobel laureate F. A. Hayek published The Denationalization of
Money in which he argued for a competitive approach to the provision of money as an alternative to the established government-run standard. Since then, many economists have become intrigued by the idea of a free market for money, where competition to issue currencies would be unregulated. Hayek argued that the "natural" invisible hand would produce a spontaneous order in the money market that cannot originate from a humandesigned monetary authority.
According to Adam Smith's theory of the invisible hand, when left undisturbed, markets are able to coordinate the actions of self-interested individuals and direct such individuals toward activities that promote general welfare. Competitive market forces, by establishing a "reward-penalty" (profit-loss) structure, induce the supply of goods that are strongly desired by consumers relative to their cost of production. As Dowd (1988) emphasizes, the money industry, is not fundamentally different from other commodity markets, and therefore, should be analyzed using the same tools. 1 In the same way that competition leads companies to maintain the quality of their products, monetary arrangements that are left to the market, will give strong incentive to competitive issuers of currency to maintain the quality (value) of their currency. 2 Although, competitive issuers have an incentive to collect seigniorage on their money creation, the issuers will need to preserve public confidence, and competition should result in only "normal" rates of return. As defined by Cukierman (1992) seigniorage is the amount of real purchasing power that currency issuers can extract from the public by printing money. When seigniorage is excessive, the burden of lost purchasing power should cause self-interested consumers to switch away from the currency to a different one.
Considerable controversy surrounds the effect of barriers to entry in the money industry. Some economists argue that the existence of entry barriers is a source of inefficiency because it does not allow the optimization of the value of a nation's currency. In contrast, other economists think that the entry barriers are necessary to prevent rapid inflation or even hyperinflation. 3 The purpose of this paper is to empirically address the relationship between currency competition and inflation. 1 Throughout this paper I shall use the term "money industry" to refer to all money-producing firms, whether private or public. 2 The value of a currency can be measured by its purchasing power. 3 England (1997) summarizes the opposition to currency competition and states the basic argument that as the cost of producing money decreases, the money supply would expand faster, causing rapidly increasing prices. For other literature on the opposition to currency competition refer to Friedman (1960) and Pesek and Saving (1967) . Also, I would like to avoid any confusion about the meaning of inflation by citing Kernmerer's (1934) definition of inflation that was quoted in Bryan (1998) and stated that "inflation exists in a country whenever the supply of money…increases relative to the demand for the media of exchange, in such a way as to bring about a rise in the general price level." 4 This paper is not attempting to look at all issues involved in the abandonment of central banking and the adoption of a free banking system with currency competition. For a discussion on other related issues, such as bank runs and panics, natural monopoly, and counterfeiting, which are all outside the scope of this paper, refer to Williamson (2002) , Friedman and Macintosh (2001) , , Selgin (1988), and Sechrest (1993) .
Most economists agree that the only sustainable long-term objective of monetary policy is maintaining the purchasing power of money. 5 Maintaining the purchasing power of money, or in other words, achieving a low level of inflation, promotes economic prosperity. In his address to the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas, Wim Duisenberg (1999) , the president of the newly created European Central Bank reaffirmed his belief that low inflation is necessary for maintaining sustainable output growth and high levels of employment. Duisenberg made it clear that the European Central Bank believes that even moderately high rates of inflation are harmful to economic growth. This argument is shared by Barro (1996) who found a negative relation between inflation and economic performance in 100 countries from 1960 -1990 . Also, Carlson (1997 shows that the Fed's actions aimed at maintaining a low inflation environment are associated with substantial economic growth.
Hence, the main question that this paper tries to answer is whether competition in issuing currency will result in lower inflation. Specifically, this paper examines the constraints that a currency issuer faces when government restraints are placed on currency competition within the country's borders and from abroad.
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The set up of this paper is as follows. Section 2 will review some of the literature on free banking with an emphasis on actual international experiences, and will present some relevant literature on foreign currency competition. Section 3 will analyze the average rates of inflation for nine countries under free-banking when compared central banking. Section 4 will provide empirical evidence showing the effect of foreign 5 Refer to Altig (2002) for a discussion on the importance of preserving the purchasing power (value) of a nation's currency. 6 Currency competition can be of two kinds. First, competition to the domestic currency can come from abroad in the form of currencies supplied by foreign central banks. Second, the currency competition can come from inside the borders from private suppliers.
currency competition on the average inflation rates of OECD countries. Finally, Section 5 will present concluding remarks and policy implications.
Relevant Literature
As defined by Selgin and White (1994) a free banking (laissez-faire) monetary regime is a regime without a state-sponsored central bank, where no barriers are placed on private issuers of currency to enter or exit the money industry. Also, there would be no government mandated capital requirements to enter the money market. Although no current free banking regime exists in the world, free banking has existed in the past for many countries.
The free banking regimes that did exist were not purely laissez-faire, because they were characterized by some government regulation. However, all of the free banking arrangements were characterized by simultaneously having more than one currency-issuer.
Thus, the barriers that existed did not inhibit competition as much as do the entry barriers currently in place under central banking.
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The emergence of public choice theory, with its skeptical view about government's role in the economy, has renewed support for the analysis of free banking. This literature regards the activity of central bankers with skepticism, and argues that the utility function of central bankers includes not only a concern for public interest, but also the pursuit of self-interest. Tullock (1975) compares the incentives of private currency issuers to the incentives of governments. He hypothesizes that governments tend to discount more heavily the distant gains of economic growth than does the private sector. Therefore, when 7 It should be noted that central banking regimes are characterized by one government monopolized issuer of the domestic currency, which is the opposite of the competition that is prevalent under free banking regimes.
governments have the exclusive right to supply money, they face a lack of incentives to keep the level of inflation low because the gains of devaluations are immediate. emphasizes that when the population is left with no alternative currency, but the one that government provides, then the central monetary authority has less incentive to provide sound money. More specifically, central bankers, because of political incentives, begin to use seigniorage regularly to collect revenues and finance government expenditures. Hayek thinks that the inflationary pressure is a political force that monetary authorities have never been able to resist, and his only hope for stable money is to "find a way to protect money from politics." The bottom line is that the rate of money production, under a central bank,
can be driven by other incentives besides the public interest. 8 Ultimately, the public choice explanation for the establishment of a government-run monopolistic central banking system
is that it provides the government with a source of revenue.
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Many economists have looked at the economic outcomes of countries with past experiences in free banking in an attempt to find an economic justification for the elimination of free banking. The majority of these studies find that the switch to central banking regimes, as characterized by pure government monopoly currency providers, was not economically warranted. In fact, White (1992) praised the very unregulated Scottish experience of laissez-faire banking in the nineteen century for its economic performance.
The money market in Scotland was self-regulated, highly competitive, and ultimately promoted strong economic growth of the Scottish society. The suppression of this well functioning regime had nothing to do with economic performances or monetary instability, but followed from the pressure of English theoreticians. Similarly, Weber (1988 Weber ( ,1992 analyzes the long-standing Swiss laissez-faire regime, which lasted approximately one hundred years. The competitive issue of money in Switzerland was characterized by low inflation, and provided a secure monetary system.
Continuing the research on free banking, Nataf (1992) surveys the literature on the experience of free banking in France. This period of free competition in the French money market is unanimously considered efficient according to the literature Nataf surveyed.
Also, the French money market was shown to be highly stable and helped to put an end to the long-running inflation caused by the monopolized currency supplied by the previous monarchial regime. Nataf (1992) stated that "an arbitrary act of authority" put an end to the free banking system in France, and the Bank de France was created to be the sole supplier of money to fund Napoleon's ambitions. Selgin (1988) succinctly characterizes the Australian episode of free banking as a period of time that was associated with fairly stable prices, while the monopolization of the Australian currency resulted in a "dramatic" rise in prices. Dowd (1993) develops the Australian free banking experience more exhaustively. He argues that the results of this regime were all positive, by fostering stability up until non-systemic bank failures produced an opportunity for inept government interventions, which aggravated the banking crisis and ultimately led to the creation of the central bank. In an overview of the world history of free banking, Schuler (1992) summarizes the free banking experience of approximately sixty countries. He concludes that in general these competitive money market regimes were stable and were dismissed for political reasons, which were supported by mainstream economic theory.
Competition of private currency providers within a country's domestic borders is not the only form of currency competition. Competition can also originate from foreign central banks. Tullock (1975) hypothesizes that governments who want to collect revenue through inflation prefer that no substitutes to their currency develop, even foreign alternatives. He says that by making foreign currencies illegal for citizen to hold, governments can make the transaction cost of using the foreign currency very high. Facing high transaction costs, individuals will not use or hold alternative currencies, and will only demand the government issued currency. Therefore, the monetary authority has incentive to keep the value (or purchasing power) of its currency high. Second, public opinion may pressure the domestic government to maintain low inflation, as they will want to replicate the example set by other lowinflationary countries.
Camera, Craig, and Waller (2001) theoretically show that if a government fails to adopt policies that maintain the value of its domestic currency, the domestic population would choose to use a more stable foreign currency as its medium of exchange. Craig (1996) relates the Russian experience of 1992-1995 to illustrate his claim that competition, provided by stable foreign currencies, forces the monetary authority to lower inflation and concentrate more of its efforts in providing a sound domestic currency. In a country where the population rebelled and established the dual-currency system (dollar/rubble) by holding dollars illegally, the only way for the Russian monetary authority to collect seigniorage, was for the rubble to become the dominant currency again. The monetary authority had to decrease the inflation rate of its currency to regain its purchasing power and increase the population's demand for the domestic rubble. Generally, the Russian experience shows that a total deregulation of the domestic monetary system may not be needed in order to achieve low levels of inflation. Rather, competition from foreign currencies may provide the domestic currency issuer with the incentives to keep inflation in check.
Free Banking Era
In this section, calculations of annual average inflation rates during the free banking eras that occurred in Australia, Canada, France, Italy, New-Zealand, Spain, Switzerland, Sweden, and the United States are presented and compared to the average annual inflation rates after the creation of each country's national central bank. Referring to Table 1 , the third column shows the average inflation rate during the free banking era, and the forth column shows the average inflation rate after central banking began. The fifth column of Table 1 reports the change in the average inflation rate for each 12 When the CPI was not available or offered few years only for the period of time I was interested in, I used the percent change in the whole price index (WPI) as a measure of the inflation rate. When both CPI and WPI were available the results were virtually identical and only the measures using the CPI are reported. All data are from Mitchell's various volumes of International Historical Statistics and the IFS CD-ROM, and were adjusted to make 1995 the base year in all cases where the CPI was used.
country, which is measured as the average inflation during central banking minus the average inflation during free banking. Thus, a positive number implies that the rate of inflation under central banking is higher than the rate under the free banking regime.
In order to check the significance of the findings, a difference in mean test was performed, which included the following null and alternative hypothesis to be tested:
Where µ 1 is the average annual inflation rate during the free banking years, and µ 2 is the average annual inflation rate after the central banking system began. I use a standard twotailed t-test where the computed t-statistic follows the following calculation: where n 1 is the number of years during the free banking era, n 2 is the number of years after central banking began; and s 1 and s 2 are the inflation rate variances during the free banking and central banking eras respectively. The degree of freedom is measured as [df = n 1 + n 2 -2]. For all countries, the null hypothesis of equal average annual inflation rates was rejected at the 10% significance level.
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My results, find that in each country for which data are available, average inflation during the free banking period was significantly lower than inflation under central banking.
Italy and France experienced the largest increases in inflation after moving to central banking. Interestingly, Schuler (1992) claims that both of these countries abandoned their free banking regimes strictly for the purpose of gathering revenue. Although, the United
States experienced lower rates of inflation during its free banking era, it had the smallest increase in inflation rates after moving to central banking. It is interesting to note that, according to Schuler (1992) , the United States ranked as the most regulated of all "free" banking systems. This result implies that the switch from a highly regulated competitive money industry to a monopolized government currency provider perhaps does not as large of a change in inflation.
The findings in Table 1 highlight the fact that competition in the supply of money among private issuers results in lower inflation rates than does a central bank. Furthermore, these findings directly refute the claims of Friedman (1960) , and Pesek and Saving (1967) that competitive private currency providers would have tendency to over-issue their currencies ultimately producing hyperinflationary pressures.
The evidence presented above suggests that free banking is associated with lower inflation rates than is central banking. One potentially complicating factor, however, is that following the equation of exchange, the rate of real output growth can affect the relationship between money growth and inflation. Specifically, for any given level of money growth, inflation will be lower during periods of faster real output growth. Thus, it is necessary to see whether a difference in the average rate of real output growth can serve as an alternative explanation of the results. Data on GDP or industrial production was available for six of the nine countries and the results of the difference in means test for output growth rates between the free-banking and the central-banking eras are presented in Table 2 . 14 For none of these countries does there exist a significant difference, thus it is possible to eliminate faster real output growth as a source of the differing rates of inflation.
[ Table 2 about here]
One of the main objectives of this study is to give empirical evidence that sheds light on the debate over whether private issuers have a tendency to over-issue their currency, which in turn will lead to higher levels of inflation. My results show that the freebanking opponents' argument that private competition will lead to hyperinflation is unfounded. In fact, the inflation rates under competition are significantly lower than when central banks have the monopoly over currency issuance. As mentioned by Selgin (1988) , and illustrated here, higher inflation seems to be a tendency of centralized banking. These results suggest that competition among currency suppliers provides consumers with choices that enhance their well being.
Foreign Currency Competition
In this section, I extend my analysis by exploring how foreign competition influences a domestic central bank's behavior. In particular, I attempt to see whether competition from foreign central banks leads to less domestic inflation, or, in other words, to a sounder domestic currency.
For this analysis I use an index that measures the freedom of a country's citizens to hold foreign currencies constructed by Gwartney and Lawson (2001) . 15 This measure of competition is consistent with the more theoretical literature pertaining to foreign currency competition, such as Tullock (1975) and Vaubel (1986) . I then attempt to correlate this index with the average annual inflation rate for all OECD countries from 1970 to 1999.
16 Figure 1 illustrates the strength of the correlation in this data.
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[ Figure 1 about here]
In order to support the findings that are illustrated in the figure, the average inflation rates were regressed solely on the index of freedom to use alternative currencies and results are presented in the first column of Table 3 . The index of freedom to use alternative currencies is negative and significant at the 5% level. This implies that greater freedom of citizens to hold foreign currency leads to less inflation. To investigate this relationship more rigorously I then add to this basic model a number of factors that have been identified by previous literature, in particular by Banaian, Burdekin and Willett (1995) , as significant in explaining variation in inflation rates. This expanded model takes the form:
where, I i is the annual average inflation rate for country i. IFAC i is the Index of Freedom to Use Alternative Currencies for country i, G i is the government deficit as a share of GDP for country i, TRADE i is the volume of trade as a share of GDP for country i, Y i is the per exchange rate, and allocates a rating of ten to countries where domestic currency is fully convertible without restrictions. The rating decreases toward zero as the black market exchange premium increases toward fifty percent. 16 Out of the 30 OECD countries, only the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic are absent from the analysis, as those countries have been formed in the early 1990s. 17 Mexico, Turkey and Poland have experienced hyperinflation during many years of the sample period. These countries appear to be significant outliers, and were omitted from the figure.
capita GDP growth for country i, GINI i is the gini coefficient for country i, IND i is the index of the independence of each country's central bank.
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[ Table 3 about here]
The estimates from this extended model are presented in Table 3 . 19 As can be seen in Table 3 , the estimated coefficient on the index of freedom to use alternative currencies is negative and significant at the 5% level. This result implies that foreign currency competition results in less inflation.
Conclusion
Understanding the fundamental variables that influence inflation can help policy makers become better prepared to design credible policies. From an empirical standpoint, my results suggest that an increase in the degree of currency competition is associated with a decrease in inflation. In other words, a government that permits foreign or domestic currency competition is forcing its monetary authority to achieve lower rates of inflation, providing a sound environment for economic growth.
My findings have strong implications for Eastern European countries (in particular
Hungary, Romania and the Slovak Republic, which have a low degree of freedom to hold alternative currencies) that want to join the European Union and are required to lower their inflation rates. My results suggest that it might be advantageous to associate their central banking reform effort with an increase in the level of permitted domestic currency 18 The average annual inflation rates, trade volumes, and measures of GDP come from the IFS CD-Rom; the per capita GDP growth measures come from the World Economic Outlook; the Gini coefficients are from the World Bank; and the index of central bank independence is from Cukierman (1992) . 19 Turkey, Poland, Japan, Iceland, and Portugal were removed from the sample because of the lack of data. competition. Currency competition will discipline these central banks and will result in reducing inflation rates. Stevens (2002) notes that modern electronic money issuers have caused a resurgence in the academic debate about competitive private issuers of currency. 20 In light of these growing financial innovations, Alan Greenspan (1997) is concerned about the role that the government should play in the "new private currency market of the 21 st century." He urges the government not to inhibit the potential of innovation by imposing regulations, and also, emphasizes that the U.S. optimum financial system is one of free and broad competition.
My results provide evidence that this increased competition is beneficial and should not be restrained. 20 For example, issuers of electronic money, such as stored-value cards and network money, are private providers of substitutes of U.S. government currency. Notes: The starting date of the free banking years does not reflect the starting date of the free banking era, but the first year of the free banking era when data on industrial production or GDP were available. Significance levels represented by: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% 
